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Methodology  
 
 
The present material represents the Dynamics of Mayors’ Political Affiliation: the case 
of Romania, one year before the local elections in 2004. The gathering of the data 
was carried out by consulting the membership lists provided by the political parties, 
except for the Social Democratic Party (PSD) that did not provide that information. At 
the same time, the study used the data received from the County Councils’ 
Presidents from all over the country (except Bacau County) and the data received 
from the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs which contained the results of 
the partial elections organized since 2000. All these data were correlated with the 
press information, by monitoring four national newspapers (Adevarul, Evenimentul 
Zilei, Jurnalul National and Romania Libera) between July 2001 and August 2003. 
The resulting data were compared with the Institute’s data-base that contains the 
elected mayors in the local elections from 2000, and also with the results of mayors’ 
political migration, one year after the local elections. Whenever the mayor’s political 
affiliation was disputed by more then one party, individual telephonic checking was 
carried out, during August and September. This research was finished before the 
National Liberal Party (PNL) - Democratic Party (PD) alliance.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Concerned with the problem of political stability at the local level, viewed as an 
equilibrium and consistence factor for elaborating and implementing the local public 
policies, the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) elaborated, with its own resources, this 
material in order to support the necessary discussions before the electoral year 2004, 
and the end of the present Government term. This is the second evaluation that the 
Institute elaborated, after the one in 2001 (Political Migration in Local Public 
Administration one year after the local elections in 20001).  
 
The material contains comments and graphics related to the mayors’ migration in 
Romania in 2003. The texts are both referring to the political reasons that determined 
the migration as well as to the considerations regarding the budgetary implications of 
the phenomenon in the local public administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Policy Institute (IPP) 
Bucharest 
 
3 Hristo Botev blvd, 2nd floor, suite 3 
Sector 3 
phone/fax 021 314 15 42 
office@ipp.ro 
www.ipp.ro 
                                          
1 Copies of the 2001 report are available at the Institute’s office as well as on its web site.  
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A few Considerations on the Political Events Resulting in Effects at the Local 
Level of the Political Party’s Activities 
 
 
After the electoral year 2000 completed, a series of changes in the political affiliation 
occurred all over the country, local and national leaders getting engaged in different 
political projects that were aimed at strengthening and increasing the percentage 
obtained at the elections.  
 
The present material does not aim to accomplish a political analysis on the political 
parties’ evolution after 2000. Still, a series of events like splitting and merging, 
affecting mayors’ migration, have been taken into consideration. The attached 
analysis represents a radiography the Romanian mayors’ political situation, in order 
to facilitate a debate related to the following issues:  
1. the impact that the growing phenomenon of mayors’ political migration has 
upon the stage of the public administration reform, especially at the local level, 
and, closely related to the fiscal reform, constantly criticized of lack of 
objectivity, as well as 
2. to the feeling of belonging to the political values that some of the locally 
elected representatives place on a secondary level compared to the material, 
political, conjectural  interests, and also to the “success” of the political parties’ 
human resources policy, which we have noticed.       
 
Through a radiography based on a vast research accomplished within the last 
months (starting with checking the political parties’ data and interviews with their 
representatives, and also hundreds of individual phone calls to the mayors that were 
“claimed” by none or more than one political party) the Institute for Public Policy 
offers this material as an instrument for a more extensive analysis on the state of 
reforming the activity of the political parties, at the last moment when such an 
evaluation can be objectively done. From the experience of the previous research on 
this issue, we realized that the forthcoming elections are directly proportional with the 
growing number of migrated mayors and that the reasons change as we come closer 
to the elections’ date.  
 
Explaining the phenomenon of political migration can be considered a very difficult 
task. Whenever the mayors themselves hesitate to say to which party they are 
affiliated to (and we dealt with many situations like this during the telephonic 
interviews with the mayors), is still difficult to relay on an honest picture of the causes 
leading to political changes, made without any hesitations from one political side to a 
totally opposite one.  
 
The political hitch-hiker can already be considered an important type of political actor 
in Romania. This type can be found in the local administration and it is represented:  
- by either the category of those who leave towards the governmental party in 
order to get political, financial, personal or group advantages,    
- either the category of those who act in the same way, apparently from 
concerning reasons towards the financial status of the community, trying to 
solve its problems “at any costs” - as a number of mayors confessed on the 
phone. The generous goal of sacrificing for the well-being of the community, 
can be, in this way, a proof for the accusations related to the subjective funds 
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allocations or preferential opening to information that can increase the 
financial revenues of the community, identified as one of the causes of the 
mayors’ political changes from the parties that supported them during 
elections to the Social Democratic Party. 
 
On the other hand, IPP identified as one of the main conclusions of the 
documentation carried out both in Bucharest and country-wide, the lack of “team 
spirit” that the political party from the today’s opposition cannot succeed in 
consolidating by communicating and team-working with their colleagues from the 
local level. This results in the alienation of the affiliation feeling for the political values 
that were sometimes embraced, leading to the changing affiliation of an important 
part of the Romanian mayors towards PSD. The press signaled various times the 
team spirit that the PSD members have - including, or mainly, when talking about 
corruption accusations. The solidarity that the members of this political party show is 
rather famous.  
 
Following the same demonstration, it must be underlined - like an alarm signal for the 
opposition parties that are recruiting their members more and more difficult out of a 
population that shows no interest to politics - a series of mayors that we’ve talked to 
complained that they haven’t been contacted by their party colleagues (PD, PNL, 
PUR) for a very long while. The people at the local level, including the mayors, 
cannot identify  themselves with the team spirit of the liberals or democrats anymore, 
as they used to when joining the party. A possible explanation can be offered by the 
fact that within most parties’ list of mayors of the opposition parties can be found 
names that exist in all the lists of these parties, and a centralized situation and 
updated one does not exist at the central level. The only political party that has an 
up-to-date list of its mayors is PSD, but the list is not available, IPP trying multiple 
times to obtain it.  
 
In reality, a series of mutations can be seen in the local political picture, after the 
2000 elections’ conclusions. The enthusiasm of some political leaders to create their 
own political parties, especially in PNTCD where the internal disputes continue till 
today to affect the number of locally elected representatives, was seriously 
decreasing in the last year. One year before the elections, the political parties are 
trying to regroup themselves, but unfortunately, the objectives established at the 
central level are not shared by the representatives at the local one (or sometimes, not 
even correctly communicated to the local level). Being aware that during this time 
they had consolidated their own position in the eyes of the local electorate (we are 
talking about the year 2003, three years of public function) the locally elected 
representatives, having gained also an important position inside the local branches of 
the party, are rejecting the political decisions at the central level and are slipping 
towards totally different political areas but that they can offer, we have been 
informed,  the “political freedom that they need to have”.  We think that, some mayors 
developed the satisfaction of strengthening the local influence especially for those 
that meanwhile were elected for important political functions in the party’s branches 
or even at the central level; at the same time, the category of the “local barons” was 
developed, the category that the press had so largely spoken of. It is to be mentioned 
the profile of the local politician Stelian Dutu from Constanta who, by a single, 
personal decision had left, one after another, PD, PNL, PUR and then came back to 
PD. He succeeded to mobilize for a similar and jointly act an impressive number of 
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locally elected representatives (approximately 23 mayors). A similar political 
movement, but whose signals did not coincide with the reality, was done by the 
senator Viorel Pana, an influent leader of the PD branch from where he resigned.  
 
These motivations, combined with the lack of ability at the central level (especially of 
the opposition parties) to stimulate their colleagues from the local level, in order to 
develop and strengthen their affiliation to the party’s team and to show to the ones in 
the countryside that finally their voice is heard by the leadership of the party, are 
regarded in the current material as a cause as important as the financial attraction 
that the opposition parties invoked.  
 
The accession to the financial resources remains one of the main causes of the 
mayors’ migration, and a concentrated analysis on this theme, with the necessary 
resources as to include a representative sample of the locally elected representatives 
from Romania, is vital but in a middle period of the political term in order to have the 
results not prejudiced by the forthcoming elections. An important role in the funds 
distribution still belongs to the president of the county council, who under the cover of 
a mathematical formula of distributing the funds among the communities of the 
county, remains especially opened to formulas that help the mayors coming from the 
same political party. As the name of the President of the Gorj County Council was so 
often mentioned lately, we have added only one example, from May 2003 when a 
series of mayors from this county joined PSD. We also find interesting the motivation 
presented by the migrated mayors that had claimed at that time, the fact that they no 
longer feel supported by the leadership of the parties they had just left.  
 
Also strongly supporting with the examples mentioned before, the observation of 
some mayors from different parts of the country must be kept in mind. They say that 
they are very often “visited” by control institutions from Bucharest on the base of 
artificially fabricated reasons, according to what they declare. The Environmental 
Control Institution had lately done numerous checkings to the city halls and the 
mayors declared to the press that many of the reasons invoked were not real, those 
kind of controls having, in their opinion, the role to discourage the opposition mayors.  
 
The fact that PSD had developed a strategy to attract members and also locally 
elected representatives is no longer a secret. In the first months of this year, PSD 
was instituting a committee itself, formed by leaders from Bucharest: the action group 
for uniting the social democratic movement, with a declared purpose to attract into 
the party as many members as possible, especially from the Democratic Party. The 
opposition parties’ reaction greatly differed, ranging from Traian Basescu (PD) who 
addressed an international memorial on this issue and who threatened with the 
suspension of PD’s branch which would sympathized with the idea of getting close to 
PSD, to PUR that, when confronted with the same danger, a few months later, asked 
its local leaders to strengthen the organization and to stay united. Otherwise, PUR 
would have to declare later that PSD’s strategy brought only disadvantages, the new 
members signing in for PUR, as a solidarity gesture. Even in PNL there were 
reactions, besides the well-known mayors of this party who evoked in the press, 
institutional and European Organizations campaigns, the Locally Elected 
Representatives League, in June this year, had strongly sanctioned the drawings that 
were the result of “pressure and blackmail, one way of pressure being the county 
distribution of funds to the local communities, that are given, in most cases, only on 
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political criteria”.  Another example of this kind of pressure is the one in Alexandria 
where the PUR leader resigned from the party in order not to be fired from the 
leadership of the Agriculture Direction of Teleorman.  
 
The results of the partially elections must be reminded as well. These elections were 
organized since 2000 and the results were that out of 81 elected mayors, 59 
belonging to the government party (72,8%). 
 
The political decisions from Bucharest are not always received as the leaders of the 
political parties would like to. Of course that every political act cannot equally satisfy 
everyone from all over the country; still, it is worth mentioning that the insufficient 
communication and consultation that, as we have noticed from discussions with the 
migrated mayors, affects especially the most important present opposition parties. 
Most leavings that affected the PNL are recorded around the merging between the 
National Liberal Party and the Alliance for Romania (March 2003) when some local 
leaders, elected in the local administration, have not been contented. Part of them 
migrated to PUR (as is the case with the branches from Caras Severin, Dolj, Barlad), 
but an important part have also migrated to PSD. 
 
Certainly, the last category is that of the locally elected representatives that do not 
manifest any political responsibility and migrate indifferent to the area of the political 
spectrum (for instance, entire PSD branches from Neamt became PNL members 
from February 2003). No matter their motivations, one can notice the way these 
persons migrate as a group, claiming the fact that they are seeking a party to 
represent their political vision, whereas the true motivations are only their personal or 
group revenues. 
 
Without any doubt, one cannot ask restricting the liberty of the political option, 
including the level of the centrally or locally elected representatives. The fact that in 
Romania, the majority won in the elections can be significantly changed due to 
migrations from different areas of the political spectrum means that there are some 
questions to be posed, also concerning the cohesion and the consistency of the 
adopted policies. Through effective recruiting and promoting strategies, as part of a 
human resources policy strategy that the parties should develop and follow, it is 
possible to ensure a responsible political class at the local level and, implicitly, a 
decrease of the phenomen of political migration.  
 
 
Coordinators of the project  
Adrian Moraru, IPP 
Alexandra David, IPP 
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Considerations on the Relation between the Public Finances System and the 
Political Stability in the Local Public Administration 
 
 
The significant rate increase in the mayors’ migration in the local public 
administration within the latest years have been influenced by various factors, 
including among the most important the human resource policy of the political groups 
and the lack of a responsibility feeling of the political class’ representatives. Besides 
these, an important role is played by the impact that the local public finances has on 
the phenomenon of mayors’ migration. 
 
Although there are many initiatives for modifying the legislation and the procedures 
within this field in Romania, it can still be rightfully argued that the system of 
budgetary transfers from the central to the local level is still, on one hand, highly 
political, and on the other hand, it results in negative effects on the administration’s 
activity in the field of local development.  
 
 Although it has been pointed out by the representatives of the civil society from 
Romania, those of the political groups, local administration and international 
organizations (among these being the Congress of the Local and Regional Powers 
and the European Commission Delegation at Bucharest), the influence of the political 
factor on the way the funds’ distribution can be inferred, but has not yet been 
demonstrated. The Institute for Public Policy has had initiatives in this sense, 
although the main obstacle is represented by the lack of the centralized data 
necessary for correlating the migration phenomenon with that of the funds’ 
distribution. Though there are data regarding the budgetary execution of all the 
localities in Romania, offering therefore a image on the sums of the funds allocated 
from the central level (in this respect, the sums for equalization of the local budgets 
are relevant), there is not yet a system of centralizing the localities’ necessities that 
can be periodically updated; on this issue, the estimations made by the local 
authorities are not sufficient. Only a correlation between the necessities, the allocated 
funds and the political migration can offer the real dimension of the impact that the 
system of local public finances has on the political stability in the public 
administration.  
 
Nevertheless, the money influence on the politics from the local level and, implicitly, 
on the mayors’ decision to migrate especially towards the governing party, can not be 
contested. Within this context, it is worth mentioning the role that the County 
Council’s President has in the funds’ distribution towards the local communities that 
are part of the county. 
 
In what follows, three relevant examples from 2003 are presented in order to show 
the political influence on the system of budgetary transfers. 
1. A relevant situation for the link between the mayors’ political membership and 
the transfers executed at the county’s level is manifest at the elections’ 
moment. In May 2003 the partial elections took place in various local 
communities from Romania, especially in the rural residency. In Gorj county 
the argument frequently used, to put it more precisely the threat formulated by 
the president of the County Council in order to persuade the electorate to vote 
in favor of  the PSD mayors has been that their localities will no longer receive 
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funds for railways and social assistance; this fact clearly shows that at least in 
Gorj county is within the County Council’s President’s power to direct these 
money, thus not taking into consideration the criteria included in the 
legislation. 
2. The same essential element, that of the power that the County Council’s 
President has, as part of his/her role in distributing the equalization funds is 
also demonstrated by the declarations made when the above-mentioned 
presidents from Satu Mare and Teleorman organized the Referendum for 
adopting the Law on Reviewing the Constitution. Although there is not a direct 
link with the phenomenon of political migration, this example shows that, 
despite some criteria included in the law, the County Council’s Presidents can 
manage the funds for the local communities according to their wish. 
3. The affiliation of the mayors to the governing party, that possesses the 
necessary financial means, proves to be an advantage and can constitute a 
solid reason for the mayors’ migration when it comes to the funds allocated for 
investments, which are essential for the local development in Romania. The 
Government created with one year before the elections a mechanism to create 
the premises to simplify the transfer of the funds towards the mayors with 
membership in the governing party. We are here referring to the protocol 
accomplished in April 2003 by the Minister of Administration and Internal 
Affairs and the Romanian Commercial Bank, creating certain facilities in 
granting the municipal credits, although there are legal provisions that allow 
contracting borrowings without the Government’s intermediary. This example 
comes to support the idea that being mayor, as a representative of the 
governing party, means to have access to the funds. Supporting the same 
idea are the examples for granting the guarantees for the external borrowings 
and distributing the sums from various special funds.   
 
The examples previously mentioned represent arguments to support the idea that the 
local financial autonomy in Romania is still more of a goal to attain than a real fact. 
The situation is more dramatic in the rural place of residence. While the urban 
communities have multiple means to supplement their incomes, the villages are 
generally dependent on transfers and equalization funds. This fact can be concluded 
in the idea that the migration is higher in the rural residence due to budgetary 
reasons; about the same place of residence it can also be said that the ideological 
considerations are more fuzzy, compared to the urban residence. 
 
One of the instruments that can be used for diminishing the political influence on the 
budgetary transfers system is represented by the legislation. The Law 189/1998 on 
the local public finances had a lot of deficiencies from this point of view. In June 2003 
the Emergency Ordinance no.45 that will be in operation in January 2004 and, which, 
not only does not solve certain deficiencies of the Law 189 but, in certain aspects, 
represents a step downwards.  
 
One of the most obvious aspects regarding this issue refers to the criteria for 
distributing the equalization funds. Although in the article no.29 of the Ordinance 
certain criteria have been established, the impact of these modifications is canceled 
by introducing a County Commission, formed from the President of the County 
Council, the Prefect and the representatives of the associative structures of the local 
authorities (components of the Local Authorities Federation in Romania) and the 
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general director of the Local Public Finance of the County. The commission’s role is 
to consult, as a result of applying the criteria, the county’s mayors in order to evaluate 
the necessities and, accordingly, to decide the sums’ distribution. Besides obvious 
legislative errors (including the Prefect in the Commission, the one that is supposed 
to supervise enforcement of the provisions, and not their implementation or 
appointing the Federation’s component associations), the commission is more a 
factor in favor of the political interference in the system of transfers than an element 
against it. 
 
In what follows some recommendations that concern diminishing the degree of 
political influence of the system of budgetary transfers to the local public 
administration will be presented: 
 
• The Emergency Ordinance 45/2003 requires considerable reviewing among 
which we recommend: 
- The formula of the financial capacity of the localities used in the funds’ 
distribution to be described along other objective criteria 
- The Commission responsible for organizing the consultations with the mayors 
should be dissolved and the role of the County’s institutions in the funds’ 
distribution removed. 
- Giving the possibility to the local communities to directly negotiate with the 
Finance Minister according to some clear and objective criteria with the aim of 
distributing the equalization funds. 
 
• Continuing the process of fiscal decentralization and that of the public services, 
as well as correlating these two for a real autonomy of the local communities from 
Romania. 
 
• Instituting clear sanctions for those responsible in distributing the funds to the 
local communities (presidents of the County Council at that time) that conditions 
the budgetary transfers’ towards some actions with political influence of the 
county’s mayors. 
 
• Constructing a database, administered by the Administration and Internal 
Affairs Minister, that can be permanently updated with information on the 
localities’ profile and their necessities. 
 
 
Anca Ghinea, IPP 
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Main Conclusions from the Graphical Representations 
 
 
The analysis of the statistical data presenting the situation of those mayors that 
migrated after closing the elections from 2000 shows that in 2001, as it has been 
shown in the previous study carried out by the Institute for Public Policy, 651 mayors 
migrated, meaning a percentage of 22%. The evolution of the data in 2003 shows an 
almost similar increase comparing to 2001. Therefore, between 2001 and 2003, other 
617 mayors changed their political affiliation (20.73%). As a result of this, an alarming 
percentage of 37.21% from the 2003 mayors are within other party than the one that 
won the 2000 elections. 
 
The destination of most migrated mayors is represented by the Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) that has increased from 35.5% mayors in 2000 to 53.6% in 2001 and 
64.4% in 2003. In total, comparing to 2000, there is an increase of 29.9% of the 
mayors that are members of this party. A relative constant situation can be noticed, 
not surprisingly, at the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), 
where the conflicts within the party did not result in major outcomes regarding the 
mayors’ number. Hence, comparing to 2000, UDMR has a slight increase of 0.3%. 
Again a positive evolution can be found for the Humanist Party in Romania (PUR) - a 
percentage of 1.5%, the main cause being the accomplished alliance with PSD and 
the presence at governing for a considerable period. In what follows, as a result of 
the recent split of the two parties, it is likely that a certain decrease should occur 
among the PUR mayors. 
 
Other decreases, if not dramatic, then still important for Romania’s democratic 
system, can be noticed at the main opposition parties. The not sufficiently coherent 
human resource and especially, recruiting policies determined the Democratic Party 
(PD) to lose in 2003 a percentage of 6% from its mayors, whereas the National 
Liberal Party (PNL) lost 1.6%. The important losses, at least in PNL’s case took place 
in the last two years. If in 2000 there were a percentage of 8.5% mayors of this party, 
in 2001, we can remark an increase to 8.9%, a percentage that decreased in 2003 to 
6.9 %. The Greater Romania Party (PRM) has a decrease, not a very large one, of 
only 1% compared to 2000. 
 
Due to the evolutions from the political life, to merging and splitting, a lot of political 
parties lost their mayors elected in 2000. ApR is an example in this sense, as a result 
of merging with PNL, all its 284 mayors are presently in other parties, PNL being only 
one of them. 
 
An important conclusion resulting from the statistical data analysis is the fact that 
most of the migrated mayors are from the rural place of residence. One of the main 
causes explaining this phenomenon has been previously described in the present 
report and refers to the dependence of the rural communities on the state budget. 
This fact further means that the mayors from rural residency are more vulnerable to 
the political influence affecting the current activities and the development of the 
corresponding communities. 
 
At the same time, it can be said that the mayors elected in the second round of the 
2000 elections are more vulnerable as well, whereas the mayors selected in the first 
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round are sufficiently confident in the local communities’ support; this is why, in the 
latest mentioned case, the political affiliation does not change, as there are not 
sufficient reasons to determine this change.  
 
A classification of the counties shows that most mayors that migrated in 2003 come 
from Sibiu, Constanta, Teleorman, Bistrita-Nasaud and Neamt  where there is a 
migration of more than 50%; at the end of the classification,  the counties most stable 
from this point of view can be found, respectively, Harghita, Covasna and Cluj with a 
migration level under 20%. 
 
 
Statistics analysis and graphic representations 
Adrian Moraru, IPP 
Monica Toba, IPP 
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Evolution of mayors' number 
elections 2000 results - IPP 2001 monitoring - IPP 2003 monitoring 
         
  2000 2001 2003 2000 2001 2003 Increase 
Rank Party Counts Counts Counts Percent Percent Percent % 
1 PSD 1050 1584 1947 35,5% 53,6% 65,4% 29,9% 
2 PD 483 407 307 16,3% 13,8% 10,3% -6,0% 
3 PNL 251 262 206 8,5% 8,9% 6,9% -1,6% 
4 UDMR 148 149 159 5,0% 5,0% 5,3% 0,3% 
5 Indep 159 90 115 5,4% 3,0% 3,9% -1,5% 
6 PUR 32 64 76 1,1% 2,2% 2,6% 1,5% 
7 Others 275 121 71 9,3% 4,1% 2,4% -6,9% 
8 CDR 147 116 57 5,0% 3,9% 1,9% -3,1% 
9 PRM 66 53 37 2,2% 1,8% 1,2% -1,0% 
10 ApR 284 79 0 9,6% 2,7% 0,0% -9,6% 
11 PSDR 62 32 0 2,1% 1,1% 0,0% -2,1% 
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Mayors' Migration at the County's Level 
2000 - 2003 
      
Judet Stable Migrated Total Stable Migrated 
Sibiu 25 37 62 40,3% 59,7% 
Constanta 28 38 66 42,4% 57,6% 
Teleorman 38 50 88 43,2% 56,8% 
Bistrita-Nasaud 27 32 59 45,8% 54,2% 
Satu Mare 30 31 61 49,2% 50,8% 
Neamt 37 37 74 50,0% 50,0% 
Prahova 52 48 100 52,0% 48,0% 
Hunedoara 36 33 69 52,2% 47,8% 
Galati 33 27 60 55,0% 45,0% 
Alba 42 34 76 55,3% 44,7% 
Mehedinti 36 28 64 56,3% 43,8% 
Maramures 40 31 71 56,3% 43,7% 
Brasov 31 23 54 57,4% 42,6% 
Suceava 59 42 101 58,4% 41,6% 
Caras-Severin 46 31 77 59,7% 40,3% 
Vaslui 45 30 75 60,0% 40,0% 
Dolj 60 39 99 60,6% 39,4% 
Olt 62 39 101 61,4% 38,6% 
Botosani 45 27 72 62,5% 37,5% 
Arges 62 37 99 62,6% 37,4% 
Gorj 44 26 70 62,9% 37,1% 
Ilfov 25 14 39 64,1% 35,9% 
Tulcea 31 17 48 64,6% 35,4% 
Buzau 55 30 85 64,7% 35,3% 
Valcea 56 30 86 65,1% 34,9% 
Mures 64 33 97 66,0% 34,0% 
Bacau 58 29 87 66,7% 33,3% 
Vrancea 43 21 64 67,2% 32,8% 
Giurgiu 33 16 49 67,3% 32,7% 
Ialomita 36 17 53 67,9% 32,1% 
Arad 51 24 75 68,0% 32,0% 
Iasi 62 27 89 69,7% 30,3% 
Calarasi 38 15 53 71,7% 28,3% 
Bihor 71 26 97 73,2% 26,8% 
Dambovita 61 22 83 73,5% 26,5% 
Baila 32 11 43 74,4% 25,6% 
Timis 62 20 82 75,6% 24,4% 
Salaj 46 14 60 76,7% 23,3% 
Cluj 65 16 81 80,2% 19,8% 
Covasna 35 4 39 89,7% 10,3% 
Harghita 59 1 60 98,3% 1,7% 
Bucuresti 7 0 7 100,0% 0% 
Total 1868 1107 2975 62,8% 37,2% 
 
 
 
 
 
IPP - Dynamics of Mayors’ Political Affiliation: the Case of Romania 2000 - 2003 
 16 
 
Mayors' Migration at the County's Level
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Mayors' Migration - Rural/Urban
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Mayors' Migration elected in 1st round/2nd round
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Number of migrated mayors  
2000 - 2003 
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Percentage of migrated mayors within county total  
2000 - 2003 
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Percentage of migrated mayors within county total  
2000 - 2003 
 
 
